The 'religious turn' in the study of international relations has started to break through and inform concrete policy discussions. The first part of this article briefly explains that breakthrough, and the broader context for Italy's engagement with religious 
foreign policy making. Johnson and Sampson's Religion: The Missing Dimension of Statecraft (1994) was one of the first books from within the foreign policy establishment to make the case for the need to study the relationship between religion and foreign policy. A decade later a subfield of research on 'Religions in International Relations' had been clearly established, and only three years ago a Religion and International Relations Section was founded within the International Studies Association. 1 This trend reflected the exponential increase in last fifteen years of the number of studies, publications, and research projects on religion and international relations. 2 Also indicative of these developments was the launch of this journal in 2003, an increasingly important forum for research and foreign policy debate on religion in international relations. In its own way it has contributed to the increasing institutionalization of these developments in the academy and policy making communities. Policy. Critically reflecting on the failures and lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan, the report shows how the Western community failed to understand the key role that local mainstream Islamic communities played in providing education, sanitation, and other social services when the state structure no longer existed, as is the case with a so-called failed state. Framing religion exclusively through the counter-terrorist framework prevented bringing religion in constructively as part of the solution to build stability, the central objective of the international community's new comprehensive approach to security and development. The Chicago report established the basic ideas of the "religious engagement" approach.
The U.S. State Department, following the recommendation of an internal Religion and Foreign Policy Working Group (2011-12) to "make better policy and to make a bigger difference," to use the words of a recent conference sponsored by the Foreign Office. 3 The E.U. is starting to develop its own approach to religion and international relations, especially in the framework of promoting "intercultural dialogue" and in relation to religious freedom (Annicchino 2014 Any foreign ministry is concerned with specific policy issues, and at least one of the things it wants to know from any proposed dialogue and engagement with religious non-state actors is how religious non-state actors can help achieve its foreign policy goals or objectives (or indeed how together they can identify common foreign policy goals that could facilitate engagement and cooperation on the country's wider objectives). In other words, how can the foreign ministry, religious communities, and religious non-state actors make better connections at home and abroad?
If the foreign ministry and religious non-state actors are to better engage and connect with each other on different aspects of foreign policy, then both sides need to see how they can make better connections. Both sides also need to see that (1) they require the right kind of tools-physical, conceptual, or analytical-to make the right kind of connections, and they also need to see (2) how they can do so on specific global issues or policy dilemmas. The problem is, as Friedrich Kratochwil has said repeatedly, if all you have is a hammer, then every problem in the world looks like it needs a nail to fix it (Kessler et al 2010, 7) . It is not always possible, either for foreign ministries or religious non-state actors, to see the new types of connections they can make, or even how to make them, if all you have are the old tools that are only able to work on the old materials.
The central theoretical starting point of this article is that in some way "religion,"
whatever it is about, it is also about power, a central concept in political science (along with authority, legitimacy, and ethics or justice). This means religion's importance and relevance is more wide ranging than is indicated by limiting its presumed role to the impact of ideas on politics-as one understanding of the concept of political theology would imply (Cavanaugh and Scott 2004) . This is also why foreign ministries need to be concerned with religion. Foreign ministries need to take seriously how power, authority, and legitimacy are constructed by religious actors-institutions, organizations, and communities-since this will affect overall foreign policy effectiveness across a whole not the main concern of any foreign ministry (research in theology, religious studies, and the anthropology and the sociology of religion deal with these issues) (Orsi 2003) .
However, it is central to religious communities and the religious non-state actors that operate within them, and between them, and which connect the concerns of the foreign ministry to religious concerns, social groups, and communities. In other words, we need to come to terms with the fact that today the international society is experiencing an epoch-making process of transformation: the economic shift towards the East, the emerging great powers embedded mainly in non-Western cultures, religions, and civilizations (BRICs); global urbanization, with the world now more urban than rural-with not only the majority of people, but also the majority of young people living in the megacities of the global South (Goldstone 2010) 4 ; and the rise of the global middle class, in which the world for the first time in history will move from being mostly poor to mostly middle class. Our contention is that the global resurgence of religion is actually significantly related to these structural societal changes-much more significant than many foreign ministries, commentators, and even scholars of international relations would suggest. So, contrary to secularization theory, from Sao Paulo, Chicago, Lagos, and Cairo, to Seoul and Jakarta, megacities, mega-churches, mega-mosques, and being religious, educated, and middle class goes together. Moreover, China may be indicative of all these shifts, since by 2050 it could have the largest number of Muslims and Christians in the world (Micklethwait and Wooldridge 2009; Thomas 2010a ).
Therefore, we need the realism to recognize the emergence of a new multipolar world, one that is also a postsecular world of multiple modernities and varieties of secularisms, i.e. there are increasingly multiple ways of being religious and being modern in the twenty-first century . The merging of "modern" political values and practices with traditional local references and ways of living, often rooted in religious traditions, will in all likelihood be the rule rather than the exception in the twentyfirst century. The fact is that for most of the people in the world, and especially in the world of the global South, all life is lived not only within secular political ideologies and worldviews. Far more importantly, life is lived within theologies and spiritualties (Thomas 2010b) . These are the real existing communities that concern, or should concern, any foreign ministry.
However, what is crucial regarding the approach set out here is that it moves beyond the limited perspective of seeing religious non-state actors primarily as "moral cheerleaders"-prophets, advocates, or activists for ideas, ethics, morality, and norms in foreign affairs and in foreign aid or international development assistance. This limited perspective is what justifies the concern that if you bring religion into foreign policy, foreign policy gets confused with social work. Basically, the role of religious non-state actors is reduced to: (1) helping to alleviate suffering, and (2) Rewriting the secular script means it is increasingly recognized that there is, and even always has been, a role of religious non-state actors in promoting peacemaking, human rights, international cooperation and development (Barnett 2012 There is another key point, however, that sets out the perspective of this paper: It is that more than ever in our contemporary world the "bottom" and not the "top" of society is (or at least should be) an important location to construct knowledge about international relations-to understand the functioning of social, political, and economic systems, and for knowledge about the consequences of choices in foreign policy. The idea that the bottom of society, i.e. the poor, the marginalized, is the preferential place for ethics is not new: it can be found in the Catholic tradition in the notion of "the preferential option for the poor." What we argue, however, is that the bottom and not the top of society can also be the preferential place for epistemology, for discovering what knowledge is, how it is constructed, and in whose interests it is constructed in international relations. If this is the case, then religious non-state actors can be an important resource for generating or constructing new knowledge in international relations, knowledge relevant to foreign policy makers. It is knowledge coming from what Pope Francis has called "the periphery," a metaphor he uses to describe social marginality, as part of a religious criticism of liberal conceptions of globalization (Ferrara 2015) . This is also why religious non-state actors have more than a humanitarian and a moral cheerleaders role to offer, as important as this role is. Mohamed Bouazizi, the street vender in Tunisia who set himself alight and whose act became the symbolic incipit of the Tunisian revolution and the broader Arab spring.) And it is here that issues emerge that need to be defused before the occurrence of social eruptions or explosions (Thomas 2014) . Therefore, given this perspective, perhaps it
should not be so surprising that Pope Francis summarized his first early homilies at Santa Marta thusly: the truth is an encounter (Bergoglio 2014) .
Clearly, this is not the world of the foreign ministry but it is very much the world of religious non-state actors, which can be local or foreign, or both (as aspects of mission), and which often have long-term commitment to the country. Perhaps this is not even the world of secular Western elites. However, it is the increasingly relevant social fabric of the world. Religious dynamics are contributing to many of the changes and transformations that the predominant Euro-centric social and political frameworks of analysis are struggling to understand. In other words, this new approach to religious engagement relates to what is neither ordinarily the world of foreign policy practitioners nor religious actors. But, the insights and perspectives it generates are certainly relevant to foreign policy concerns-problems of political stability, social cohesion, and religious extremism-as well as arguably useful to the religious actors (more than they might realize). This means for the foreign ministry there may be a closer relationship between knowledge, diplomacy, and interreligious dialogue than what is usually thought to be the case.
The encounter and dialogue that religious non-state actors participate in is also not in the first instance a type of multi-track diplomacy in peace building or peace making.
Multi-track diplomacy, conventionally understood, is the dialogue and negotiations on specific political issues that involve states and secular or religious non-state actors in civil society, often engaging with those actors that have been a party to the conflicts (Twiss et al 2015) . However, if the bottom and not the top is the privileged location to construct new knowledge in international relations, then it will be increasingly necessary for both the ministry of foreign affairs and religious actors to have an on-going, i.e. an organizationally established, engagement with each other-focused on new knowledge related to specific issues or regions of the world. The foreign ministry may benefit from new kinds of knowledge religious actors may bring-e.g. nuanced understanding of smoldering situations, tensions, anxieties, and resentments, before they erupt, or erupt violently, and become "events" in international relations. Religious actors also can benefit from the way the ministry of foreign affairs engages the political constituencies whose policies and actions influence the life of the people who religious actors deal with every day.
Italy as a Special Case of Foreign Policy and Religious Engagement
The The discussion of the Italian case reminds us of the great multiplicity and diversity of geo-religious locations and histories, as well as of the wide spectrum of statereligion arrangements that can be found even within the Western world. The model of religious engagement that we have proposed here, for example, clearly diverges conceptually from the model that is currently predominant in the U.S. to the extent that it envisages religious engagement abroad through religious engagement at home, something that seems contrary to the American state-church separation model. In some way, our conceptual discussion a fortiori confirms that the search for the one single best model of religious engagement in foreign policy should be resisted. The new knowledge of international relations that today's foreign policy makers are looking for is surely marked by the plural, the local, the societal, the culturally-specific-and, perhaps most importantly we have argued, the religiously-specific.
